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NDYP is an extensive programme of assistance to young people who
have been unemployed for six months or more, which began in April
1998.  Its aim is to help these young people to find lasting jobs and to
increase their long-term employability.  Through NDYP, they are
provided with an intensive support process to find a job, known as the
‘Gateway’, which is intended to continue for up to four months.  If they
remain in the programme beyond this period they are then required to
enter one of four options:
• Employment Option, offering subsidised employment
• Full-time Education and Training
• Voluntary Sector Option
• Environment Task Force Option
NDYP is the largest labour market programme in Britain.  By the end of
January 2002, 753,600 young men and women had taken part or were
taking part in NDYP.  Currently about 83,900 people are participating.
NDYP has been evaluated through a wide range of research projects.
This report summarises results from one of the main groups of research
projects, labelled the ‘Macro’ evaluation.  The Macro evaluation was
concerned with establishing both the direct effects of NDYP in terms of
increasing employment and lowering unemployment, and its wider effects
on the labour market and the economy.  Its main aim was to estimate the
impact of NDYP as comprehensively as possible, taking account of effects
that went beyond the immediate participants.
Research was commissioned at the National Institute of Economic and
Social Research (NIESR) and at the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), and
some analysis was also conducted internally within the Department for
Work and Pensions.  The research teams covered different but overlapping
aspects of NDYP’s impacts.
The NIESR findings were published in two previous summary reports,
the more recent appearing in December 2000.1  The present report brings
together and compares the NIESR and PSI findings for the first time.
The New Deal for Young
People (NDYP)
The Macro evaluation of
NDYP
1 Riley, R. and Young, G. (2000)  The New Deal for Young People: Implications for
Employment and the Public Finances, Research and Development Report ESR62,
Sheffield: Employment Service.
2The main findings in relation to the impact of NDYP on youth
unemployment were:
• NIESR estimated that NDYP led to a reduction in long-term (of more
than six months’ duration) youth unemployment of 45,000.  Long
term youth unemployment would have been almost twice as high in
March 2000 without NDYP.
• NIESR estimated that total youth unemployment was reduced by
approximately 35,000 over the same period.  This took account of
some increased inflows into short-term unemployment following
NDYP.
• PSI estimated the impact of NDYP in a different way, which is not
directly comparable to the NIESR estimates.  They estimated the extent
to which NDYP participants were less likely to be unemployed at
various points after they had started the NDYP scheme.  Their estimates
(covering the first year of entrants to NDYP) were 39,000 additional
exits at six months from the NDYP entry-point, and 12,000 at 18
months from the entry-point.  PSI also estimated that up to 17,000
additional young people had exited from unemployment before the
entry point to NDYP.
• In addition PSI looked at the impact on the level of total youth
unemployment (rather than at specific time points) and estimated a fall
of around 40,000, which is close to the NIESR estimate.
The main findings in relation to the impact of NDYP on youth
employment were:
• NIESR estimated that over the first two years of the programme,
60,000 more young people moved into jobs than would have been
the case without NDYP.  More than half moved into unsubsidised
jobs.
• PSI estimated that, among the first year’s entrants, 11,000 NDYP
participants were in work six months after joining NDYP who would
not have been if the scheme had not existed.
• NIESR estimated that NDYP had raised total youth employment by
approximately 15,000 by March 2000, excluding those on the
Environment Task Force and Voluntary Sector Options.
• PSI’s analysis of the total youth labour market suggested a rise in youth
jobs of about 40,000 per annum as a result of the stimulus provided by
NDYP.  This figure, which is higher than NIESR’s estimate, could
reflect a short-term effect and be unsustainable.
Both NIESR and PSI examined whether NDYP, by helping 18-24 year
olds into work, had led to an increase in unemployment or a fall in
employment for other age groups.
Changes in youth employment
Changes in youth
unemployment
3• NIESR concluded that there was little evidence of substitution.  They
found a reduction in the numbers within other age groups leaving
long-term unemployment, particularly in the first two quarters after
the introduction of NDYP, but as this was greatest in areas where
NDYP was not yet fully implemented, it was not attributed to NDYP.
• PSI found no adverse effect for people in other age groups.
The different strands of the research looked at some possible mechanisms
by which NDYP had an impact on employment and unemployment.
• PSI examined variation across local areas in the rates at which NDYP
participants left unemployment.  The main factors leading to higher
local exit rates were a more intensive approach to the Gateway process,
and higher expenditure on the Gateway and on Environment Task
Force and Voluntary Sector Options.
• PSI found no evidence that job search had become more intensive
among 18-24 year olds as a whole, following the introduction of NDYP.
However, job search had previously risen following the introduction
of Jobseeker’s Allowance and this increase had been maintained.
• NIESR concluded that NDYP had helped to reduce wage pressure by
reducing long-term unemployment.
The impacts on the wider economy were derived by simulation using
NIESR’s model of the UK economy.  By increasing the effective labour
supply, thus helping to restrain wages, NDYP could be expected to
generate a beneficial response in the economy as a whole.  The simulations
also took account of changes in productivity and taxation resulting from
NDYP.  The main results were as follows:
• National income was around £500 million per annum higher as a
result of NDYP, indicating a welfare gain to the economy as a whole.
• After taking account of lower benefit payments and higher tax revenues,
worth about £3 in every £5 spent, NDYP was likely to cost the
Exchequer less than £150 million per annum until March 2002.  This
did not take into account possible social benefits attributable to the
programme.
• The annual Exchequer cost per extra person in employment, including
those in Environment Task Force and Voluntary Sector work, was
estimated to be in the region of £4,000 per annum.  The cost per
extra person in employment excluding those in Environment Task
Force and Voluntary Sector Options was about £7,000 per annum.
NDYP produced positive impacts in terms of less unemployment and
more employment for participants.  The evidence about wider labour
market and economic impacts was also generally positive.  NDYP increased
youth employment as a whole, without any detectable disadvantage to
other age groups.  By reducing wage pressure, NDYP led to an increase





4been recovered through reductions in unemployment benefits and
increased tax revenues, while by raising national income, NDYP provides
a benefit rather than a cost to the economy as a whole.
5The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) commenced as a national
welfare-to-work programme in April 1998, after operating in Pathfinder
areas since January of that year.  Its aim is to help young people who have
been unemployed for six months to find lasting jobs and to increase their
long-term employability.  On reaching eligibility, young people enter
the NDYP Gateway, in which they are given intensive support to find a
job, over a period intended to continue for up to four months.  Those
that do not find a job then pass into one of the Options:
• Employment Option; a job with a wage subsidy and training provision
• Full-time Education and Training Option; leading to a vocational
qualification
• Voluntary Sector Option
• Environment Task Force Option
Some further details of the programme are included in Section 2.1.
NDYP is the largest labour market programme in Britain.  By the end of
January 2002, 753,600 young men and women had taken part or were
taking part in NDYP.  Currently about 83,900 people are participating.
NDYP was accompanied by a wide range of research projects to evaluate
its impacts.  This report considers one of the main groups of research
projects, labelled the Macro evaluation.  Research was commissioned at
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) and at
the Policy Studies Institute (PSI).  NIESR’s findings have been published
previously, but this report brings together and compares the main findings
of the two evaluation projects for the first time.  In addition, the report
includes some results from analysis conducted internally within the
Department for Work and Pensions (initiated in the former Department
for Education and Employment).
The report is in seven chapters.  Chapter 2 explains the nature of the
evaluation and discusses some of the features of NDYP.  Chapter 3
addresses NDYP’s impacts on youth unemployment and on employment.
Chapter 4 looks at the wider impacts on the youth labour market.  Chapter
5 reports on some of the mechanisms by which NDYP may have produced
its impacts.  Chapter 6 looks at implications for the whole economy and
public finances.  Chapter 7 summarizes the chief findings and draws overall
conclusions.
In presenting the results, we will refer to the various papers from which
they have been taken by source and number: e.g., NIESR(1).  The papers
are listed at the end of this report.
INTRODUCTION1

7The Macro evaluation was concerned with establishing both the direct
effects of NDYP, and its wider effects on the labour market and the
economy.  Even without labour market interventions, many people get
jobs and leave unemployment.  The research presented here seeks to net
out these underlying outcomes and to measure the additional effect that
can be directly attributed to the programme.  The term ‘deadweight’ is
used to describe money spent on those who would have got jobs anyway,
even if there had never been a programme.  Evaluating the effect of a
programme on the participants is often called establishing the ‘net of
deadweight’ effect.
In addition, by examining the wider effects of NDYP on the labour market
and the economy, the Macro projects attempted to go beyond the
customary scope of programme evaluations, which usually focus upon
the impacts for those that participate.  The Macro evaluation was also
concerned with the impact on the whole youth labour market, on
employment as a whole, and on the economy as a whole.
One of the reasons for embarking on this wider evaluation was to check
that NDYP did not have adverse effects for those who were outside its
remit.  A welfare-to-work programme tries to make its participants compete
more effectively for jobs, and to the extent that they do compete more
effectively, they may take jobs from other people, who either remain in
or enter unemployment as a result.  These knock-on effects are often
known as ‘substitution’ and ‘displacement’.
This need not happen, however, if employers respond to the increased
availability and quality of job seekers by increasing the number of vacancies
they offer, and/or if the increased competition for jobs helps to restrain
wage pressures.  Developments of these types can have beneficial effects
for the wider economy.
As well as assessing the scale of wider impacts, the evaluation was also
concerned with the mechanisms by which the programme’s effects were
transmitted to the wider economy.  For example, did young people look
more extensively for jobs as a result of NDYP?  Examining such
mechanisms helps to work out the implications for the wider labour
market and the economy.  Knowledge of the mechanisms can also be of
value for the design of future programmes.
The main aim of the Macro evaluation was to estimate the impact of
NDYP as comprehensively as possible, taking account of effects that went
beyond the immediate participants.  The supplementary aim was to
examine mechanisms that might transmit the effects of NDYP to the
wider labour market.
THE NATURE AND AIMS OF THE MACRO EVALUATION2
8NDYP has five features that are particularly important from an evaluation
viewpoint.
NDYP is a programme for all people aged 18-24 who reach six months
of claimant unemployment (non-claimants of the relevant benefit,
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), are not eligible).  Participation is mandatory
rather than voluntary, although there is substantial choice of pathways to
follow within the programme.
This feature has important consequences for the evaluation.  Most
evaluations in the past have been based on comparing those who chose,
or were chosen, for a programme with those who could have gone on
the programme but did not.  This is impossible in the case of NDYP,
indeed no closely similar group of non-participants is available for
comparison.  An alternative approach is to make the comparisons on a
before-and-after basis, using a different age group as the comparator.  All
the projects made considerable use of this approach, which will generally
be referred to as the ‘before-after group difference method’, although it
is also known as the ‘differences in differences method’.
There are up to three main phases of NDYP for a participant.  The first
phase, lasting up to four months in principle, is the Gateway, in which
the participant receives intensive support for job search from a Personal
Adviser.  A large proportion of entrants leaves NDYP during the Gateway,
for example by getting a job.  The second phase, for those not leaving
earlier, is participation in an Option.  This can continue for six months,
or even for one year for those in a full-time education and training course.
For those who remain unemployed at the end of their Option, there is
then a period of Follow-through, to enable participants to consolidate
the training and experience gained on Options.
An important implication for the evaluation is that the full effect of NDYP
requires a fairly long period to become apparent.  Short-term outcomes
give only a partial impression of NDYP’s impact.
As noted earlier, there are four main Options and participants are required
to enter one of these, if they have not left unemployment during the
Gateway.  Selection of an Option results from personal choice, the
guidance provided by the Personal Adviser, and the availability of places.
Evaluating the separate effects of the Options was not an aim of the ‘macro’
projects.  A separate evaluation study, using a different approach, was
commissioned to assess the effectiveness of the Options relative to one
another (see Bonjour et al., 2001).
2.1  The main features of
NDYP: implications for the
evaluation
2.1.2  A sequential programme
2.1.3  Multiple Options
2.1.1  A universal and mandatory
programme
9Unemployment status can be affected by participation in NDYP, and
this can have consequences for comparisons of outcomes between pre-
and post-New Deal periods or with other groups of unemployed people.
This is particularly important because of the mandatory nature of the
programme.  It should be appreciated that there are two main definitions
of unemployment in use in Britain, one based on being a claimant of the
benefit Jobseeker’s Allowance, the other based on the ILO definition
which takes account of job search activity and availability for employment.
While participants are on the Gateway, they remain on JSA and continue
to be regarded as claimant unemployed.  When they enter an Option,
however, they exit from claimant unemployment, and may then be
classified in a number of different ways. If after an Option they enter
Follow-through, they again re-join JSA and become claimant unemployed,
in what is regarded as a new period of unemployment.  (For further
discussion of the implications of NDYP for unemployment statistics, see
Wood (1998)).
After New Deal it no longer makes much sense to compare claimant
unemployment of more than one year’s duration between 18-24 year
olds and other groups.  The structure of NDYP makes it nearly impossible
for any 18-24 year old to reach one year of unemployment.
Furthermore, all comparisons of unemployment are affected, because the
level of unemployment among 18-24 year olds is reduced by exit to
Options, to a larger extent than occurs with movements into programmes
for other age groups.
The delivery of NDYP was contracted to 144 local bodies known as
‘Units of Delivery’ (UoDs).  All were operated as a partnership involving
the Employment Service, employers, and educational, voluntary sector
and environmental organisations.  In the majority of cases, these were led
by local units of the ES, but a small number were led by private
organisations.  The UoDs were permitted substantial flexibility in the
way in which they delivered the programme.
The existence of these distinct local delivery bodies makes it possible for
the evaluation to consider each UoD as contributing separately to NDYP’s
impact.  It also raises questions about the extent to which the programme’s
effects varied across areas, and the reasons for such variation if it existed.
2.1.4  NDYP participation affects
unemployment status
2.1.5  NDYP delivered with local
flexibility
10
There were two main projects that assessed the impact of NDYP from
different perspectives:
• The project commissioned at NIESR produced four main outputs,
which have already been published in previous summary reports
(NIESR(3,5)):
- The first two analyses used information aggregated at the level of
the ‘Unit of Delivery’, the local areas in which NDYP is
administered and delivered.  They produced estimates of the NDYP
impact on the unemployment of 18-24 year olds and on additional
moves into employment from unemployment.  They also included
an assessment of potential adverse effects on unemployment in
other age groups.
- A further analysis was concerned with one of the main mechanisms
by which NDYP might affect employment in the economy as a
whole, namely wage pressure.  This used both national and regional
data on changes in wage levels.
- The fourth part of the research made use of NIESR’s model of the
UK economy (NiDEM), which is used extensively for
macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis.  This part of the
inquiry produced simulation evidence of the impacts of NDYP
on total employment in the economy and in the youth labour
market, and also a number of other economy-level measures,
including impacts on Gross Domestic Product, consumer spending,
and Exchequer costs.  These results took account of the wage
impacts just mentioned, but also other implications of NDYP
concerning productivity and taxation.
• The project commissioned at PSI also had four main types of output,
all of which involved analysis of individual outcomes:
- The first part of the project overlapped with the NIESR projects,
and produced estimates of the impact of NDYP on unemployment
rates and exits to employment, for the participants, at the end of
their period of participation.
- A second part of the project was concerned with how much the
programme’s effects on participants varied between the local
delivery areas, and with identifying the ‘ingredients’ of local delivery
policy which brought about improved results.
- The two other parts of the project were concerned not with
participants as such, but with changes across the youth labour market
as a whole.  These analyses used data from the Quarterly Labour
Force Surveys.  Estimates were produced of changes to job entry
rates for non-employed young people, job changing rates for
employed young people, and movement from jobs to non-
employment.  The possibility that younger workers were displacing
older workers from jobs was also investigated, as were two other
mechanisms of change in the labour market: job search activity,
and movement between industries and occupational groups.
2.2 The content and methods of
the Macro evaluation projects
11
The differences between the projects’ methods are likely to lead to some
differences in the results.  Such differences should not be seen as flaws in
the methods being applied or the data used.  All analyses involve
assumptions, and different assumptions are often equally reasonable.
However, it is often possible to judge whether the results are broadly
compatible, taking account of how similar the methods and assumptions
are.
The researchers sometimes feel unable to arrive at a single ‘best’ estimate,
and offer instead a range of estimates based on varying assumptions.  If it
can be shown that different methods of measurement, applied with
somewhat varying assumptions or limits, lead to results that are broadly
consistent with one another, then this should increase confidence in the
reliability of the evaluation’s conclusions.
Although the projects addressed different aspects of the evaluation, they
shared some common difficulties, which arose from the nature of the
programme to be evaluated and from the available information.  Two of
these are particularly noteworthy:
• It was not possible with the available information to identify movements
into employment which took place after Options, or when there was
a gap between leaving NDYP and entering a job.  This is because the
administrative databases used for this research only record the first
destination after leaving unemployment.  The implication of this
limitation is that movements to employment are probably
underestimated in those analyses, which rely on first destinations after
unemployment.  However, where the analyses extend over longer
time periods or consider outcomes for the wider labour market, the
contribution of Options should be reflected in the findings although
their contribution cannot be separately identified.
• All the projects made use of ‘before-after group comparisons’.  These
typically involve comparing the 18-24 year old target group for NDYP
with older age groups, both before and after the introduction of NDYP.
A potential difficulty with this method arises if the age groups being
compared are differently affected by the economic cycle.  If, for
example, the 18-24 year olds benefit more than older groups from an
improving economy, there would be a risk of supposing that NDYP
was producing a gain which would have taken place without the
programme.  A similar problem is created if policies that are brought
in at about the same time as NDYP affect 18-24 year olds differently
from other age groups.  Examples are the National Minimum Wage
and arrangements concerning student finances.  Several different
approaches were applied by researchers to minimise this type of
difficulty.  These included:
- using statistical methods to remove trends or other time-related
influences which would bias the estimates of the NDYP impact;
- using statistical methods to determine which periods before NDYP
could most safely be used as the baseline;
- referring to external information to assess the likely interference
from economic trends or policy changes.
2.2.1  Dealing with differences in
results across projects
2.2.2  Common difficulties faced by
the ‘macro’ evaluation projects
12
Since this is a non-technical summary, these methods are not discussed
further in what follows, but details can be found in the papers from the
projects.
13
In this chapter we consider the Macro evaluation’s evidence concerning
the New Deal’s impact on its client group, 18-24 year olds in long-term
unemployment, and its impact on youth unemployment more generally.
For the purposes of this report, unless otherwise stated, long-term
unemployment means unemployment lasting at least six months.  In the
first part of the Chapter (Section 3.1), the focus is upon reductions in
unemployment.  In the second part (Section 3.2), the focus is upon
increases in employment.
A reduction in unemployment is the most straightforward and simple
aim of NDYP.  It should be appreciated, however, that a reduction in
unemployment cannot in general be equated with an increase in
employment.  Unemployment can be reduced through increases in
government training or work experience programmes, through increased
moves to economic inactivity (including full-time education, incapacity,
and family care), and through increased movement off unemployment
benefits to unknown destinations – as well as through increased
employment.  All the research projects therefore examined changes in
unemployment as part of a wider analysis of destinations.
Long term youth unemployment fell by more than one half
following NDYP.
An analysis conducted internally by DWP used national statistics of flows
into, through and out of unemployment (DWP (1)).  This analysis
confirmed NDYP’s rapid progress towards its basic aim of eliminating
long-term youth unemployment.  In the first two years of the programme,
long-term (six months plus) youth unemployment fell by 56 per cent,
while total youth unemployment fell more slowly by 23 per cent (see
Figures 3.1-3.2).  Youth unemployment of 12 months or more had
virtually disappeared by this time.  The main reason for the latter was
that, after 10-12 months of unemployment, all NDYP participants were
required to enter an Option, which ended their unemployed status.  There
was a more than doubling in the proportion of the outflow to education
and training for the young long-term unemployed group, during the first
year of NDYP (see Figure 3.3).  Figure 3.3 indicates that as a proportion
of the total outflow, moves to jobs fell after the introduction of NDYP.
But participants were leaving JSA more quickly under NDYP than they
otherwise would have done, and overall the effect of the programme was
to increase the number of moves into jobs relative to what otherwise
might have been expected. This is discussed further in Section 3.2 in
terms of results from the NIESR and PSI research.
3 THE EFFECTS OF NDYP ON YOUNG UNEMPLOYED CLAIMANTS
3.1  Reductions in
unemployment among young
claimants




Across Figures 3.1-3.3, it is notable that most of the changes took place
during 1999 and 2000, with little further change between 2000 and 2001.
This suggests that youth unemployment has stabilised following NDYP.
However, it is not possible simply to ‘read off’ the net impact of NDYP
from these results.
Figure 3.1  Unemployment among 18-24 year olds, 1963-2001
(from DWP (1))
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Figure 3.2  Recent trends in youth unemployment (from
DWP (1))
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Figure 3.3  Destination of 18-24 year olds leaving long-term
unemployment (from DWP (1))
To obtain a first indication of the net effect of NDYP on unemployment
levels, an estimate was needed of what the unemployment level would
have been in the absence of NDYP.  Using the national unemployment
stock and flow statistics, this was derived in two ways (DWP(1)).  The
first was based on the assumption that the level of 18-24 year old
unemployment would have changed over the 1998-2000 period in exactly
the same way as the level of 25-49 year old unemployment changed over
that period (since 25-49 year olds were unaffected by NDYP).  The
difference between the change actually observed for 18-24 year olds, and
the change predicted on the basis of what happened to 25-49 year olds,
was then attributed to NDYP. The second estimate was based on the
assumption that outflow rates from long-term unemployment (six months
plus), would have remained unchanged in the absence of NDYP. Although
this might seem a strong assumption, it was consistent with the data for
the 1993-96 period (see Figure 3.4), when the outflow rate from long-
term youth unemployment appeared unresponsive to the changing
economic situation: it increased only at the end of 1996, with the
introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance.  In applying this method, the
pre-NDYP outflows were carried forward into the NDYP period to
provide the comparison with the actual outflows from unemployment.
17
Figure 3.4  Outflow rates from long-term youth
unemployment during 1992-2001 (from DWP (1))
The results of these two estimates are shown in Figure 3.5.  The two
methods led to some difference in numerical results, but both showed a
positive impact.  Using either 25-49 year olds as the comparison group
or the before-after comparison methods, the estimated reduction in long-
term youth unemployment was of the same order of magnitude as the
comparable results from NIESR which were published previously
(NIESR(3)) and are considered below.
18
Figure 3.5  Estimates of the NDYP effect on unemployment
under two different assumptions (from DWP (1))
These estimates relate to the direct impact on the group eligible for NDYP.
However, while reducing long-term youth unemployment, NDYP
increased the circulation to short-term youth unemployment: this
remained stable during the first two years of NDYP, while it might
otherwise have been expected to fall in line with the generally improving
labour market and economic conditions.  If this increased back-flow is
taken into account, the impact on youth unemployment as a whole is
slightly reduced but this does not affect the overall qualitative conclusion.
An important issue is how far this reduction was attributable to the
increased availability of Options as an alternative status to unemployment,
and how far it was attributable to increased employment.  This issue will
be considered further at a later point.
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3.1.2  Analysis using flow data
aggregated at the locality level
(NIESR)
100,000 young people per year, in the first two years, left
unemployment earlier than they would otherwise have done.
By March 2000, NDYP had reduced youth unemployment
by 35,000.
NIESR’s estimates of the effects of NDYP on unemployment took
account explicitly of the changing labour market conditions in which
NDYP was introduced (NIESR(1,2)).  Monthly data were drawn from
the same source as used for the national unemployment statistics, for the
period from January 1995 to March 2000.  Separate series of data for
each UoD area (for UoD, see 2.1.5 above) were the basis for these
estimates.  As a result, far more observations were available than for the
analysis based on national statistics.  The rates of movement in and out of
unemployment each month were analysed, while also taking account of
local differences in labour market ‘tightness’ based on job vacancy and
unemployment rates.  To obtain the net effect of NDYP, the change in
the inflow or outflow rate for 18-24 year olds was estimated relative to
that for other age groups who could not have been directly affected by
the programme.  Results were mostly presented relative to the 25-29
years age group. Comparisons with 30-49 year olds tended to give a
more favourable but qualitatively similar impression of the impact of
NDYP.
Having estimated the changes in inflows to and outflows from youth
unemployment, NIESR went on to calculate the changes in the stocks
or levels of unemployment which these would generate over a period of
time.
The main difficulty was how to take account of any underlying trend, or
change over time other than from New Deal itself, which might affect 25-29
year olds differently from 18-24 year olds.  For this reason two sets of
results are presented (NIESR(1,3)), in one of which a simple progressive
trend is applied along with the NDYP effect, while in the other, half-
yearly variation is permitted alongside the average NDYP effect.  The
conclusion reached was that the trend-adjusted results represented an
upper limit for the NDYP effect, while the results incorporating half-
yearly variation represented a lower limit (see Figure 3.6). A more
definitive result could not be obtained because of the short time-period
over which estimation was feasible, and because of the introduction of
other policies almost simultaneously with NDYP.
A figure between the upper and lower estimates appeared a reasonable
compromise.  In fact, the simple before-after group difference between
the 18-24 year olds and 25-29 year olds fell in the centre of this range.
This middle estimate pointed to a decrease in youth unemployment of
about 35,000 by Spring 2000, with the upper bound being 60,000 and
the lower bound being 10,000.
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As noted above, this represents the effect on the stock, or level, of youth
unemployment, at a particular time.  Changes in stocks are produced by
considerably larger flows out of unemployment over the course of a year.
NIESR estimated the increase in annual off-flows from youth
unemployment, to all destinations, at approximately 100,000 per annum
over the first two years of NDYP (NIESR(3)), implying that 100,000
young people per year left unemployment earlier than they otherwise
would have done.
Figure 3.6  Youth unemployment with and without NDYP
(from NIESR (1))
This estimate is not confined to the long-term unemployed who
constituted the client group for NDYP.  The analysis took account of
exits from unemployment at all durations.  The overall results which
have just been cited were built up from separate, though linked, analysis
of those leaving after various periods in unemployment: 0-3 months, 3-
6 months, 6-9 months, and over nine months.  Although the largest
relative increase in outflow rates was, as might be expected, after nine
months when Options enter the picture, there was also a discernible
increase in outflow at both 0-3 months (five per cent) and at 3-6 months
(seven per cent).  This may in part reflect early entry to NDYP
(approximately ten per cent of entrants were in special categories permitted
early entry) and young people returning to Follow-through or Gateway,
and in part a generally stimulating effect on young unemployed job seekers.
The change in the inflow rate to short-term unemployment attributable
to NDYP (NIESR(1)) was estimated at seven per cent.
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Six months after reaching the NDYP entry point, claimant
unemployment was estimated to be reduced by 39,000 for
NDYP’s first year intake.  This fell to 27,000 at 12 months
after NDYP entry point and to 12,000 at 18 months after the
NDYP entry-point.
Estimated fall of 37-39,000 in the level of youth
unemployment.
PSI’s analysis of the change in unemployment was based on individual
administrative data concerning spells of claimant unemployment (PSI(1)).
This contrasts with the NIESR project where the data consisted of totals
at the local administrative level. The data used by PSI consisted of a
representative five per cent sample of the national administrative records.
This sample included the first whole year’s intake to NDYP, together
with comparative information from several previous years.
With individual data, some account could be taken of the changing
composition of the different age groups over time.  With individual data
it also became possible to track people and see if they were unemployed
at a point well beyond their time of exit from NDYP or of their
participation in a New Deal Option. NIESR’s analysis did this to some
extent, since it included those entering and leaving the Follow-through
stage of NDYP, but it did not separately identify them.
Table 3.1 summarises some of the main results from this analysis, which
are given separately for men and for women.  The results relate to three
time-points after reaching six months of unemployment (the normal entry
point to NDYP for 18-24 year olds).  They take account both of people
who remained continually in unemployment up to a given point, and of
those who had left unemployment for any reason (including going onto
New Deal Options) but who were again unemployed at that point in
time.
The method is before-after group comparisons, with 30-39 year olds as
the comparison group.  (NIESR’s results shown above used 25-29 year
olds as the comparison group, but other evidence from the evaluation
indicates that this difference was not important).  It is assumed that the
change in unemployment for 30-39 year olds reaching the same stage of
unemployment represents what would have happened to 18-24 year olds
if NDYP had not been introduced.
3.1.3  Analysis at the individual
level (PSI)
22
Table 3.1 Estimates of the impact of NDYP on unemployment within the NDYP target
group (from PSI (1))
Men Women
Estimated change in the Change in Estimate change in the Change in
mean probability of Unemployment mean probability of being Unemployment
being unemployed (thousands) unemployed (thousands)
At 6 months from NDYP entry date
-0.213 -29 -0.185 -10
At 12 months from NDYP entry date
-0.139 -19 -0.147 -8
At 18 months from NDYP entry date
-0.054 -7 -0.088 -5
Six months after reaching the NDYP entry point, claimant unemployment
was estimated to be reduced by 39,000 for NDYP’s first year intake.
This fell to 27,000 at 12 months after the NDYP entry point and to
12,000 at 18 months after the NDYP entry-point.  These figures cannot
be directly compared with those shown earlier in Figures 3.5 and 3.6: the
present figures estimated how relative rates of unemployment changed at
certain selected time points, whereas the earlier figures estimated changes
in the unemployment level as a whole.  As explained earlier (see Chapter
1), the results at six and 12 months from entry include the effect of
movement into New Deal Options.  At 18 months, however, Options
are playing little role.  The implied annual fall in the level of youth
unemployment resulting from the reductions in the long-term
unemployed was calculated as about 22,000 (16,000 men and 6,000
women).  This may, to some extent, be an underestimate since it does
not take account of any difference which may persist beyond 18 months
from entry to NDYP.
To make the PSI estimate more comprehensive, a further analysis
considered whether NDYP increased the numbers exiting from claimant
unemployment before the point at which 18-24 year olds now become
eligible for the programme.  It was estimated that an additional 15,000-
17,000 young people (mostly young men) exited unemployment before
they reached their entry point to NDYP.  This may have been for a
number of reasons: for example, some may not have wanted to take part
in the programme, or some may have been working already and feared
detection.  Alternatively, NDYP may have given a boost to the male
youth job market in general (see Chapter 4).
Adding the change attributable to the short-term unemployed to that
attributable to the long-term unemployed leads to an estimated fall of
around 37,000-39,000 in the level of total youth unemployment.  This is
similar to the estimates produced by different methods by NIESR.
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The NIESR and PSI analyses used different methods of estimating the
impact of NDYP on claimant youth unemployment, but their main
estimates were closely similar.  NDYP was estimated to reduce the level
of youth unemployment by about 35,000-40,000.
Increasing the employment rate among long-term unemployed young
people is a central aim of NDYP.  It is recognised, in the programme’s
statement of aims, that this requires a progressive increase in employability
for the group in question.  Since the development of employability may
be a process requiring substantial time, the evaluation of NDYP’s
employment impacts would ideally be carried out over an extended period.
The main source of information on destinations used in this analysis consists
of records of spells claiming JSA. This provides information on individuals’
initial destinations (such as jobs) upon leaving benefit, but not on
employment which takes place via other destinations such as training,
education, or a period on a different benefit, since these are not included
in the JSA database.  The JSA database does however contain information
about periods of Follow-through under NDYP, and moves to jobs from
these spells have been included in the following results.
Measures of employment also, to some extent, depend on the definition
used.  Employment may be confined to unsubsidised jobs, or it may
include jobs arranged under the programme with a subsidy for the
employers.  It is also possible to regard work experience and training
placement Options as a type of temporary employment, although these
are more usually classified under government training.
Over the first two years of the programme, 60,000 more young
people moved into jobs than would have been the case without
NDYP.  More than half moved into unsubsidised jobs.
By March 2000, NDYP had raised youth employment by
around 15,000, excluding those on ETF and VS Options. When
these are taken into account, around 30,000 more young people
were in work in March 2000 as a consequence of the
programme.
As explained in Section 3.1, the estimates of change in youth
unemployment produced by NIESR were derived from analyses in which
rates of outflow to different destinations were modelled (NIESR(1)).
The same method was used to derive the additional change in the level
or stock of youth employment attributable to NDYP, with both subsidised
and unsubsidised jobs (but not the work experience Options) included.
The results are shown in Figure 3.7.
As in the case of the NIESR results concerning unemployment, there
was a range of estimates, with the central estimate derived from a simple
before-after group comparison, while the upper and lower bounds
3.1.4  Conclusion on reductions in
youth unemployment due to
NDYP
3.2  The impact of NDYP on
the employment of young
unemployed people
3.2.1  Estimation of employment
impact using flow data aggregated at
the locality level (NIESR)
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represented the more complex analyses allowing for non-NDYP trends
or time-related impacts.  The numerical range of the estimates was from
a 5,000 addition to the level of youth employment over the period, to a
20,000 addition.  An intermediate figure of around 15,000 was regarded
as a reasonable estimate, but the upper and lower bounds suggest that
some uncertainty is involved.
Figure 3.7  Estimates of the impact of NDYP on youth
employment, under different assumptions (from NIESR (1))
The change in the level of youth employment attributed to NDYP in
Figure 3.7 was derived from estimates of the additional flows from youth
unemployment to jobs which could be attributed to NDYP. NIESR
estimated that these amounted to an additional 35,000 flows to
unsubsidised and 25,000 flows to subsidised jobs over the first two years
of the programme, an average annual rate of 30,000 extra moves to jobs,
of which about 17-18,000 were unsubsidised (NIESR(3) Table 2.2).
The net additional entry to employment implied for the NDYP
group was 11,000 up to the six month point from New Deal
entry (8,000 for men and 3,000 for women), with virtually no
subsequent gain for men but a subsequent impact of 3,000
for women.
In the PSI project, individual data were used to examine movements
into employment from unemployment.  As noted in Section 3.1, the use
of individual data (rather than total flows from one status to another)
permits some longer-term changes to be tracked.  The analysis examined
moves to employment each month for 18 months after eligibility for
NDYP.  These figures excluded moves to employment directly from
Options, but did include movements from subsequent spells of
unemployment.  They, for the most part, reflect ‘employment from the
Gateway’, although with some contribution from NDYP Follow-through.
3.2.2  Estimation of employment
impact using individual data [PSI]
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These NDYP exits to employment were compared with the pre-NDYP
pattern and the corresponding movements over time for 30-39 year old
unemployed people.  The resulting before-after group comparisons are
shown in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8  Employment of 18-24 year olds (compared with
30-39 year old unemployed) up to 18 months after New Deal
eligibility date (from PSI (1))
Until month 12 after the New Deal entry point, NDYP appeared to
generate additional movement into employment in every month.  From
then on, the opposite took place, with NDYP results slipping month-
by-month below the relative position of 18-24 year olds in the pre-
NDYP period.  However, beyond the 12 month point, there were scarcely
any NDYP participants who had not already exited from unemployment,
so the numbers going into employment from unemployment were
exhausted.  Because the chart only concerns employment from unemployed
status, it does not reflect moves into employment from Options.
The net additional entry to employment implied for the NDYP group
was 11,000 up to the six month point from New Deal entry (8,000 for
men and 3,000 for women), with virtually no subsequent gain for men
but a subsequent impact of 3,000 for women.  This represented an increase
of six percentage points in employment entry up to the 6 month point
(for both men and women) and a five percentage point increase for women
thereafter.
The use of individual data also made it possible to assess the stability of
the jobs obtained.  With more 18-24 year olds entering jobs from long-
term unemployment, some reduction in stability might have been
expected.  PSI found, however, that there was no clear difference in this
respect between the NDYP period and the two years preceding NDYP.
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The conclusion was that the stability of jobs following youth
unemployment had not been affected by NDYP.
The NIESR and PSI estimates of the NDYP effect on youth employment
are not directly comparable with each other, but both indicate a positive
impact on the level of youth employment.  NIESR’s main estimate
indicated an increase in the level of youth employment of 15,000 by
March 2000, while PSI estimated a gain in net employment entry of
14,000 from the first year’s intake to NDYP.
3.2.3  Conclusions on the impact
of NDYP on the employment of
young unemployed people
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Job entry rates rose significantly for young non-employed
men but did not change for young women.
In this section, evidence about the impact of NDYP on movements
across the whole youth labour market – both into and out of employment
- are summarised.  The implications of NDYP for the level of employment
in the whole economy will be further considered in Chapter 6.
The reason for undertaking the youth labour market study (PSI(2)) was
to investigate ‘spillover’ and/or ‘crowding out’ effects beyond the
immediate clientele of NDYP.  ‘Spillover’ effects occur when non-
participants see a gain in their labour market outcomes due to NDYP,
whereas ‘crowding out’ occurs when fewer jobs are available to non-
participants as a result of the programme.  ‘Crowding out’, often referred
to as ‘substitution’ and ‘displacement’, has received most attention in the
past but ‘spillover’ also seems plausible in the context of a large programme.
For example, by making young unemployed people more ‘job ready’ the
programme would encourage employers to offer more vacancies for young
people.  Wage subsidies, which were offered under the employment
Option, could also increase employers’ awareness of youth recruitment.
Furthermore, nearly 80,000 employers were ‘signed up’ as potentially
offering placements for NDYP.  Once a youth vacancy had been created,
an employer would not necessarily limit recruitment to those from NDYP,
but would consider other young people who applied, so that the impact
would spread out through the youth labour market.  The increase in the
employability of young people through NDYP would also increase
competition in the labour market, helping to restrain upward pressure on
wages more generally (see Section 5.3) and allowing employment to
expand for other groups.
The main analysis of the youth labour market considered two types of
movement into jobs:
• Those by non-employed people who found jobs (‘job entry’)
• Those by employed people who switched jobs (‘job changing’).
NDYP AND THE YOUTH LABOUR MARKET AS A WHOLE4
4.1  Possible existence of
spillover and/or crowding out
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The chief findings, qualitatively, were as follows:
Job entry rates for 18-24 year old non-employed men rose markedly in the
NDYP period, relative to 30-39 year olds (and, indeed, relative to all
other age groups).
Job changing rates for 18-24 year old employed men did not rise to a significant
degree during the NDYP period, relative to 30-39 year olds.
Neither job entry rates nor job changing rates for 18-24 year old women rose
during the NDYP period, relative to 30-39 year olds.
The main impact was therefore among young non-employed men.
Further analysis showed that job entry rates rose similarly within this
group for those who were unemployed (according to the ILO definition),
those who were students, and those in a residual non-employed category.
This is consistent with the idea of a New Deal effect spreading widely
through the youth job market.
The lack of an NDYP impact on the job entry rate of young non-
employed women may seem surprising, since in Section 3.2 it was shown
that NDYP had a positive impact on the employment of its female
participants.  However, the number of female participants in NDYP is
relatively small compared with men, and the stimulus to the wider female
youth job market could well be correspondingly small.  There have also
been indications in recent years that female youth jobs have been readily
available while male youth opportunities (at the lower-skilled end) have
been relatively depressed.  There may therefore have been less scope for
NDYP to improve matters on the female side of the youth labour market.
Estimates suggest a 40,000 net addition to male youth jobs.
Quantification of the impact proved to be sensitive to the baseline period
which was used in the comparison, somewhat similarly to the earlier
results from the NIESR project (see Section 3.1).  It was hard to separate
any underlying trend, in favour of young people, from the successive and
possibly cumulative impacts of Jobseeker’s Allowance, in 1996, and
NDYP, 18 months later.  Because of this, the range of estimates that was
statistically feasible was wide: between 56,000 and 80,000 additional job
matches in each of the first two years of NDYP.
These figures should also be adjusted for any increase in exits from jobs to
non-employment, which would offset the increased job entry rate in terms
of an overall increase in employment.  A small change in that direction
could be detected in the figures, of 14,000 additional exits among 18-24
year olds.  Allowance also has to be made for additional exits after reaching
age 25.  On this basis, the estimates for the net addition to jobs were in
the range 40,000 – 64,000.  The various figures are summarised in
Table 4.1.
4.2  Quantifying the NDYP
impact on the male youth
labour market (PSI)
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Table 4.1  A range of numerical estimates of the NDYP
impact on increased jobs for non-employed young men (from
PSI (2))
Analysis (main assumption Basic numerical Adjusted for
about trend) estimate job terminations
(a) 1995-97 baseline
(no trend after 1994) 80,000 64,000
(b) 1996-97 (JSA) baseline
(no trend after 1995) 77,000 61,000
(c) 1997 baseline
(trend to 1997) 56,000 40,000
On balance, the most plausible estimate appeared to be that of 56,000
additional job matches, since this was based on the most simple assumptions
about the background trends.  After taking account of an offsetting increase
of 16,000 exits from jobs to non-employment, this implied a net additional
rise of 40,000 youth jobs each year.  This is larger than the estimates for
additional employment for NDYP participants from the PSI analysis
summarised in section 3.2, so that the results when taken together suggest
that ‘spillover’ predominated over ‘crowding out’ within the male youth
labour market.
This stimulus to the male youth labour market may however have been
temporary.  Whether the eventual equilibrium was at a higher level than
the pre-NDYP equilibrium would depend on whether the youth labour
market had become more efficient in some long-term way (e.g. by
permanently reducing employers’ recruitment costs), or whether the gains
were the result of a short-lived experiment in youth recruitment by
employers.
No long-term adverse effects found for other age groups.
When young unemployed or non-employed people became more
successful in the competition for jobs, did this result in other age groups
being to some extent ‘crowded out’?  NIESR and PSI have both addressed
this issue ((NIESR(4), PSI(3)).
A key assumption of PSI’s youth labour market analysis was that prime age
workers are unaffected by what happens to young people’s jobs.  So it
was not possible to examine whether this group (the 30-39s - the control
group) was affected by crowding-out.  However, this could be considered
for other age groups.  Crowding-out was not found for any of the 25-29,
40-49, and 50-64 age groups among the male non-employed.  Broadly
speaking, the improvement in the position of 18-24 year olds was about
the same relative to any of these age groups as it was relative to 30-39
year olds, whereas if there had been crowding out, the relative position
of the other age group would have deteriorated.
4.3  Crowding-out of other age
groups
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However, it should be stressed that crowding-out is inherently difficult
to detect by statistical methods, since it may be spread across numerous
groups yet occur to such a small extent in any one of them as to be
indistinguishable from random fluctuations in the figures.
NIESR assessed crowding-out for both the 25-29 age group and the 30-
49 age group.  The rates of inflow to unemployment and outflow from
unemployment were forecast on the basis of economic trends before the
NDYP period, and these expectations were compared with actual
observations.  Inflows to unemployment of 25-29 and 30-49 year olds
were no higher than expected, indeed if anything they were lower.
Outflow rates were also as expected for the shorter-term unemployed.
For the longer-term unemployed in these age groups, however, outflow
rates were significantly lower than expected, particularly in the two quarters
immediately after the national roll-out of the NDYP.  Subsequently the
gap diminished, suggesting that any initial crowding-out was short-lived.
As a further check, the pathfinder areas, where the NDYP was piloted
three months before the national launch, were contrasted with a set of
other areas.  Generally outflows from long term unemployment in the
first half of 1998 appeared to be more adversely affected in areas where
the NDYP was not yet fully implemented than in the pathfinder areas.
This suggested that there was no crowding-out effect from the favourable
treatment given to NDYP participants.  It is possible there may have
been some temporary diversion in Employment Service resources in
preparing for and introducing NDYP, resulting in a short-term reduction
in outflows for the long-term unemployed.
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Chapters 3 and 4 have indicated that there were positive impacts from
NDYP in reducing youth unemployment, increasing the employment
of young unemployed people, and increasing entry to jobs among young
non-employed males more generally.  A limitation of these analyses is
that they tell us little about how NDYP produces such impacts.  We
know from their results that the Gateway probably produces a substantial
part of the employment impact on the young unemployed (see Section
3.2), but no more.  In this section, several additional analyses carried out
as part of the NIESR and PSI projects attempt to fill this gap to some
extent.
Local differences in Gateway and Options found to be
important influences on exit from long-term youth
unemployment.
As explained in Section 2.2, NDYP was delivered through 144 local
organisations known as Units of Delivery (UoDs).  Since UoDs were
permitted some flexibility in how they delivered the programme, there
was an opportunity to learn about aspects of delivery which were linked
to higher levels of the desired outcomes.  An analysis on this theme
(PSI(4)) used information in the New Deal Evaluation Database, which
contains records of the steps or actions through which each participant
passes, together with unit cost data at the level of the UoD.  The outcomes
used in this analysis were the proportions in each UoD who had exited,
from both unemployment and the NDYP programme, at two points in
time from entry: at six months (representing a Gateway effect) and at 18
months (the longest period over which an NDYP effect could be
estimated).
Five main indicators were selected.  Two of these summarised the actions
taken in the Gateway process (these were ‘Gateway intensity’ and ‘Option
choice’), and three were unit cost measures (concerning the Gateway
process, Full Time Education and Training, and Voluntary Sector plus
Environmental Task Force Options).
MECHANISMS OF CHANGE IN NDYP5
5.1  Local variation in reducing
youth unemployment (PSI)
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Three of the five indicators were found to be related to the exit rates,
either on the six month outcome or on the 18 month outcome:
• ‘Gateway intensity’ was the most influential aspect of delivery policy,
positively affecting outcomes at both six and 18 months.  This was a
composite measure covering the timeliness and frequency of Personal
Adviser interviews, and referrals to the sanctioning process.
• The UoD’s unit cost of Gateway services had a significant and positive
impact at six months though not at 18 months.
• Conversely, the local unit cost of providing Voluntary Sector and
Environment Task Force Options had no effect at six months (when
very few clients would have completed placements) but did have a
positive and significant effect at 18 months.
Overall, the results suggested that aspects of policy under local control
could affect the New Deal’s outcomes.  They confirmed the importance
of Gateway processes, already evident in some of the earlier results, but
also indicated the potential importance of Option quality (on the
assumption that unit cost was an indicator of quality).
Higher youth job search levels following the introduction of
JSA were maintained but not increased by NDYP.
A substantial part of the NDYP impact appears to take place via the
Gateway process.  One possible mechanism by which Gateway might act
is through a relative increase in job search activity by young job seekers
compared with other age groups.
The analysis (PSI (5)) made use of information in the Quarterly Labour
Force Surveys concerning the different methods (Jobcentre, private
recruitment agency, newspaper advertisements, etc.) which the non-
employed individual had used in seeking a job.  Two measures could be
constructed by this means:
• Using any job search method, as opposed to none, distinguishes
currently active job seekers from non-employed people who are inactive.
• The number of different methods used was taken as an indicator of job
search effort, or intensity.
It should be noted that other aspects of job search that are of potential
interest, such as the number of hours per week spent searching, were not
available in the QLFS data and so could not be investigated.  The analysis
was therefore not comprehensive.
5.2  Job search and mobility in
the youth labour market (PSI)
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The crucial factor in understanding what changes in job search had been
taking place proved to be the role of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA),
introduced in October 1996 some 18 months before NDYP became a
national programme.  Compared to the pre-JSA years, JSA was found to
have a significant effect in increasing the relative activity rates of both
non-employed young men and non-employed young women.  It also
raised the relative job search effort (i.e. the number of search methods
used) among young men, though not among young women.  So before
NDYP, some stimulation had taken place in the youth labour market
through JSA.
The patterns of search activity and of search effort in the NDYP period
were similar to those in the JSA period.  Young non-employed people
were therefore significantly more active, and searching harder, than people
in the pre-JSA period, but they did not differ appreciably from their
counterparts in the JSA period.  NDYP had not brought about any further
shift in job search behaviour among the 18-24 year olds.  It had, however,
maintained the changes that had been brought about by JSA.
A further analysis explored the possibility that NDYP altered the mobility
between industries and occupations in a manner which might be favourable
to young people (PSI(6)).  Active labour market programmes would be
particularly effective if they could shift workers into industries with labour
shortages, which would typically be newer growth industries.  Several
analyses along these lines, however, found no impact of this kind being
produced by NDYP.  During both the JSA and NDYP periods, it was
actually 30-39 year old non-employed women, and 30-39 year old
employed men, who were gaining in access to growth industries relative
to 18-24 year olds.
Although this part of the project did not identify any mechanisms by
which NDYP produced its stimulus on the youth labour market, it may
be useful in suggesting that other mechanisms were involved.  As already
mentioned, these could have involved an increase in employers’ interest
in youth recruitment because of the promotion of NDYP and the
availability of wage subsidies.  Such a change on the employers’ side
would have made it easier for young people to find jobs without needing
to increase their job search.
5.2.1  Conclusions on NDYP’s
impact on job search and mobility in
the youth labour market
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NDYP contributed to a reduction in aggregate wage pressure.
If NDYP had the effect of restraining wage pressure, then it would create
the scope for more employment growth, not just for the programme’s
clientele but for the wider economy.  Conversely, if NDYP resulted in
increased wage pressure, any direct effect on clients’ employment chances
could well be outweighed by wider constraints on employment.  An
analysis to assess the likely effects of NDYP in this respect was carried out
as part of the work to link NDYP to the British macroeconomy
(NIESR(2,3)).
When a large proportion of the potential work-force is in long-term
unemployment, this tends to force up wage pressures for a given level of
unemployment, because the long-term unemployed do not compete
strongly for job vacancies.  A large labour market programme for the
long-term unemployed should convert many of them into effective
competitors for jobs, and this will generally help to restrain wages.  NDYP,
with its effect of removing young people from long-term unemployment,
should therefore have the effect of restraining wages.  On the other hand,
if this effect is largely ‘cosmetic’, for example if the young people taking
part in NDYP are mostly re-cycled back into unemployment without
any real gain in employability, the link between long-term unemployment
and wages would be broken or weakened.
A complicating factor in assessing this issue was that, one year after the
national implementation of NDYP, a National Minimum Wage (NMW)
was introduced for the first time in Britain.  The youth labour market is
of course one of the areas where low pay is particularly concentrated, so
that it should have been particularly affected by NMW (Low Pay
Commission, 1998, 2000).
An initial analysis using national wage data (NIESR(2)) indicated that
during the NDYP period, average wages increased significantly for 18-
24 year olds, and indeed to a greater extent than for other age groups.
However, this analysis did not take account of the NMW.  The Labour
Force Survey was then used to calculate separately by how much average
wages would need to rise (for each age group) to bring everyone up to
the NMW at its date of introduction.  This very closely predicted the
amount by which the age-related wages had actually risen, suggesting
that NMW was the underlying factor.
5.3  Wage pressure (NIESR)
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National wage data cannot separate the effect of NDYP and the effect of
NMW on wages, because they occurred too close together.  The analysis
resolved this difficulty (NIESR(2)) by using wage data for the UK regions.
The impact of NMW would vary across regions depending on the
proportion of workers below the minimum wage threshold, and/or on
the change in the regional wage bill required to bring pay up to the
NMW level.  Similarly, NDYP varied across regions in the proportion
of total services for the unemployed which were devoted to it.  It was
therefore possible to assess how large a role each factor had played in
raising regional wages.
The results showed that NMW had the expected effect in raising average
wages.  However, the effect of NDYP was essentially zero.  The regional
evidence therefore suggested that additional wage pressure was associated
with the introduction of NMW, and did not result from any weakening
in the relationship between long-term unemployment and wages brought
about by NDYP.  Thus, it could reasonably be assumed that NDYP had




NDYP, although a large welfare-to-work programme, is none the less
too small for its effects on the whole economy to be estimated directly.
An alternative approach is to simulate its effects using a macroeconomic
model.  This approach was adopted using NiDEM, the NIESR model of
the UK economy (NIESR(2,3)).  This is a long-established model that
has been widely used for economic forecasting and policy analysis.  The
structure of the model is such that, in the long run, employment and
unemployment are determined only by supply side factors.  It is important
to emphasise the uncertainty surrounding estimates of the wider economy
effects of NDYP.  Such estimates cannot be very precise and are less
firmly based than those that rely on the comparisons of the participant
group against a control group.
By March 2000 NDYP had reduced unemployment among
all age groups by around 45,000 and had raised employment
by 25,000, excluding those on the ETF and VS Options.
NDYP increased GDP by a little under 0.1% per annum,
worth £500 million each year.
The NIESR model permits labour market policies such as NDYP to
affect the wider economy in the long run especially through its effect on
the wage determination process.  As Section 3.1 showed, NDYP reduced
long-term unemployment.  Also, Section 5.3 showed that this resulted
in a reduction in wage pressure.  The fall in long-term unemployment
therefore allowed aggregate demand to expand without putting upward
(i.e. inflationary) pressure on prices.  It was from this expansion of
sustainable demand that a real long-term increase in employment would
arise.
The NIESR model permits a number of other effects from NDYP to be
taken into account in simulating its effect on the national economy.
NDYP should increase the productivity of participants in Options (albeit
by a small amount relative to the UK labour force).  It was also assumed
to increase the demand for labour across UK industries, through wage
subsidies and direct employment creation.  Some extra demand would
also arise from the need to provide New Deal Personal Advisers, trainers
and supervisors.  The consequences of these changes can be calculated in
the model, either with or without the wage effect discussed above.
NDYP AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (NIESR)6
6.1  The whole economy effects
of NDYP
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To illustrate the importance of the effect on wage pressure, Figure 6.1
shows how employment would develop over a five-year period, under
various assumptions.  The light blue solid line shows the combined result
of the wage effect and the other effects.  Direct employment creation is
responsible for the early rise in employment shown in the graph.  The
dotted black line shows the more gradual increase without direct job
creation.  The dark blue solid line shows the predicted result if there
were no wage effect: employment would rise initially because of the
direct job creation measures, but would soon fall back towards its initial
level as these effects were extinguished by rising wage pressure.
Figure 6.1  The response of employment to different effects of
NDYP (from NIESR (2))
The total employment effects indicated by the model simulations are
shown in Table 6.1.  The results are shown for the youth labour market,
and for the aggregate (i.e. total including youth) labour market.  Youth
employment was estimated to rise by 15,000.  Additional employment
for other age groups was estimated to be around 10,000.  Thus, taking
into account the indirect effects on the economy, NDYP had raised
employment among all age groups by around 25,000, excluding those
working on the ETF and VS Options, and had reduced unemployment
by around 45,000.  It should be stressed that these estimates are of a
different type to the estimates described in Chapter 3.  The present
estimates concern the economy-wide impact of the changes assumed to
arise from NDYP, which were not considered in Chapter 3.
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Table 6.1  Impact of NDYP on the labour market (from
NIESR (2))
Difference from counterfactual (thousands)
1999q1 2000q1 2001q1 2002q1
Youth labour market
Short-term unemployment +3 +7 +6 +6
Long-term unemployment -47 -46 -46 -46
Employment +13 +16 +16 +16
Government supported training +14 +14 +14 +14
Aggregate labour market
Short-term unemployment +1 +5 +3 +3
Long-term unemployment -48 -49 -47 -48
Employment +19 +25 +27 +28
Government supported training +14 +14 +14 +14
Notes: difference between the simulated case with the policy against a counterfactual without the policy; short-
term unemployment is unemployment lasting less than six months; long-term unemployment is unemployment
lasting more than six months; employment includes those on the NDYP employer option, but excludes
government supported trainees.
The NIESR model also permitted calculations to be made concerning
the rise in Gross Domestic Product and private consumption as a
consequence of NDYP.  The simulation results suggested that NDYP
led to an expansion of GDP of a little under 0.1 per cent per annum
(slightly less than the rise in national employment from NDYP).  The
monetary equivalent was £500 million per annum.  Household
consumption also rose, initially more steeply than GDP, partly because
the fall in unemployment would make people feel more secure about
their jobs and therefore spend more and save less (Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2  Simulated effects of NDYP on GDP and
consumption (from NIESR (2))
On average in its first four years, the net cost of NDYP to the
Exchequer is likely to be less than £150 million per annum.
Table 6.2 (from NIESR(2)) shows detailed calculations of the impact of
NDYP on the public finances.  Up to and including 1999-2000, £668
million had been spent on NDYP.  The second year’s spending represented
about 0.1 per cent of total government spending in that year, equivalent
to about 0.04 per cent of GDP at market prices.
The average net Exchequer cost due to NDYP over the period 1998-99
to 2001-02 was approximately £150 million a year, after allowing for
the reduction in unemployment and related benefits from fewer people
being unemployed, and the rise in tax receipts from increased national
income and spending.  However, this does not take account of possible
wider social benefits of lower unemployment, such as reductions in crime,
so the true net costs could be smaller; the wider social benefits are hard to
measure.
6.1.1  Impacts on the public
finances
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Table 6.2  Impact of NDYP on the public finances (from
NIESR (2))
Difference from counterfactual (£million)
1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 average
Receipts
Indirect Taxes +77 +99 +29 +27 +58
Direct Taxes +40 +72 +70 +74 +64
Expenditure
Social Benefits -108 -121 -144 -168 -135
Gross NDYP Spending +252 +352 +360 +370 +334
Net Cost
Net Exchequer Cost* +29 +80 +187 +194 +140
Cost per Job (£) +4800 +3300 +7200 +7200 +7000
* The net Exchequer cost is equal to the increase in expenditure less the increase in receipts.  Total  receipts
and expenditure include further items not shown in the table.  These are debt interest payments, profits on
government trading, spending on fixed investment and social contributions paid to government.
Notes: difference between the simulated case with the policy against a counterfactual without the policy;
financial years; jobs include those on the NDYP employer option, but exclude government supported trainees;
additional spending of £35.4 million for 1997-8 and DfEE/DSS spending of £28 million not allocated to
individual years but included in average net Exchequer cost; social benefits include JSA saving.
The estimate for net Exchequer cost of the NDYP can be combined
with estimates of the number of jobs created (estimated at 20,000 per
annum on average during these years) to calculate net exchequer cost per
job.  NIESR calculated the net budgetary cost of each additional job
created as a consequence of NDYP, suggesting that the cost per job was
in the region of £7,000 per annum.  This excludes those on the ETF and
VS Options.  When these are included as jobs the average cost per
additional job is around £4,000 per annum.
NIESR’s research suggests that in its first four years, the net cost of NDYP
to the public purse is around 40 per cent of total spending on the
programme.  This does not take into account possible social benefits
attributable to the programme.  Also, these amounts do not measure the
cost to the economy as a whole.  Indeed, since NDYP raises national
income there is an economic benefit rather than a cost to the economy.




The main aim of the Macro evaluation was to estimate the impact of
NDYP as comprehensively as possible, taking account of effects that went
beyond the immediate participants.
The impacts considered were those that were additional to what would
have taken place in the absence of NDYP.  These included additional
falls in unemployment, additions to employment, and changes to the
wider economy.
The impact of NDYP on the net unemployment of 18-24 year olds was
both in terms of stocks (or levels) and in terms of flows.  NIESR’s estimates
pointed to a decrease in youth unemployment of about 35-40,000 in the
first two years of the programme.  NIESR also estimated a reduction in
long-term (of more than six months’ duration) youth unemployment of
45,000.  Long term unemployment would have been almost twice as
high in March 2000 without NDYP.
PSI estimated exits from claimant youth unemployment, focusing on
whether exits had taken place by certain time-points, such as six or 18
months after they had started the NDYP scheme.  Their estimates
(covering the first year of NDYP) were 39,000 additional exits at six
months from the NDYP entry-point, and 14,000 at 18 months from the
entry-point.  PSI also estimated that up to 17,000 additional young people
had exited from unemployment before the entry-point to NDYP.
From further calculations based on these figures, PSI estimated that there
had been a reduction of 37,000-39,000 in the level of youth
unemployment as a whole, for the first year’s intake to NDYP.  This is
close to the NIESR estimate.
NIESR estimated that NDYP had raised total youth employment by
approximately 15,000, not including those on the Environment Task
Force and Voluntary Sector Options.  When these are included, around
30,000 more young people were in work in March 2000 as a consequence
of the programme.
PSI estimated that there were 11,000 additional job entries for young
unemployed people as a result of NDYP, within six months of entry,
with some continuing gain thereafter for young women.  This estimate is
suggestive of a gain of about 15,000 jobs, or about a five percentage
points increase in employment, for the participants in the first year of
NDYP.  As already noted, this does not include additional jobs entered
from NDYP Options.
CONCLUSIONS7
7.1  Changes in youth
unemployment
7.2  Changes in youth
employment
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PSI’s analysis of the effects of NDYP on the youth labour market suggested
a net annual additional increase in youth jobs of about 40,000, which is
higher.  However, this finding may reflect a short-term response by
employers to NDYP’s promotion of youth labour, which was not
necessarily sustainable.
The impacts on the wider economy were derived by simulation using
NIESR’s model of the UK economy (NiDEM).  The main conclusions
concerning the impacts on the macroeconomy and the public finances
were as follows:
• By March 2000 NDYP had reduced unemployment among all age
groups by around 45,000 and had raised employment by 25,000,
excluding those working on the ETF and VS Options.
• National income was around £500 million higher, indicating a welfare
gain to the economy as a whole.
• After taking account of lower benefit payments and higher tax revenues,
NDYP was likely to cost the Exchequer less than £150 million per
annum until March 2002.  This did not take into account social benefits
possibly attributable to the programme.
• The annual Exchequer cost per extra person in employment, excluding
those in Environment Task Force and voluntary sector Options, was
about £7,000 per annum.
A firm conclusion of these analyses was that NDYP produced positive
impacts in terms of less unemployment and more employment for
participants.  The evidence about wider labour market and economic
impacts was also generally positive.  NDYP increased youth employment
as a whole, without any detectable disadvantage to other age groups.  By
reducing wage pressure, NDYP led to an increase in total employment.
Much of the cost of NDYP to the Exchequer has been recovered through
reductions in unemployment benefits and increased tax revenues, while
by raising national income, NDYP provides a benefit rather than a cost
to the economy as a whole.
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